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Abstract: Underwater quantum key distribution (QKD) has potential applications in absolutely secure 
underwater communication. However, the performance of underwater QKD is limited by the optical elements, 
background light, and dark counts of the detector. In this paper, we propose a modified formula for the quantum 
bit error rate (QBER), which takes into account the effect of detector efficiency on the QBER caused by the 
background light. Then we calculate the QBER of the polarization encoding BB84 protocol in Jerlov type 
seawater by analyzing the effect of the background light and optical components in a more realistic situation. 
Finally, we further analyze the final key rate and the maximum secure communication distance in three 
propagation modes, i.e., upward, downward and horizontal modes. We find that secure QKD can be performed 
in the clearest Jerlov type seawater at a distance of hundreds of meters, even in the worst downward propagation 
mode. Specifically, by optimizing the system parameters, it is possible to securely transmit information with a 
rate of 67kbits/s at a distance of 100 m in the seawater channel with an attenuation coefficient of 0.03/m at 
night. For practical underwater QKD, the performance can also be improved by using decoy states. Our results 
are useful to long distance underwater quantum communication. 
OCIS codes: (060.5565)Quantum communications; (270.5568) Quantum cryptography; (010.4450)Oceanic optics. 
 
1. Introduction 
Underwater communication is vital for underwater 
sensor networks, submarines, and all types of 
underwater vehicles and it can be made secure using 
quantum key distribution (QKD). QKD enables two 
remote parties to set up secure keys whose security is 
based on the basic physical properties of quantum 
states, rather than relying on the computational 
intractability of certain mathematical functions in 
traditional cryptography. In1984, Bennett and 
Brassard proposed the first QKD protocol [1], the 
absolute security of which has been proved using one-
time pad encryption [2–4]. Since the first QKD 
experiment in 1989 [5] with a distance of 32 cm, a 
strong research effort has been devoted to achieving 
practical QKD. Great progress has been made on QKD 
in free space and optical fiber [6–8]. In 2016, a low-
earth-orbit satellite to implement decoy state QKD 
was launched [9] and successfully realized satellite-to-
ground QKD over a distance of 1200km with a key 
rate above the kilohertz level [10, 11]. 
 However, little progress has been made on 
underwater QKD in spite of the following works. 
|RUnderwater QKD was first proposed in 2012; Ref. 
[12, 13] showed that underwater QKD can be 
performed at a distance of 100m, thus proved the 
feasibility of underwater quantum communication . In 
2014, Monte Carlo simulation was used to study the 
propagation characteristics of polarized photons in 
seawater [14], and the effect of the underwater channel 
on QKD was analyzed. The results in Ref. [14] 
showed that underwater QKD can be performed with 
a sifted bit rate of 45kb/s at the communication 
distance of 107 m in Jerlov type-I seawater in the 
environmental condition of starlight only. These 
studies showed that secure QKD can be achieved with 
a distance of one hundred meters in the clearest 
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seawater in theory. Ji et al. completed the first 
experiment in underwater quantum communications 
through a Jerlov type seawater channel [15], which 
showed polarization qubit and entanglement can 
maintain well after going through seawater channel 
and therefore experimentally confirmed the feasibility 
of underwater quantum communication. The influence 
of imperfect optical elements on the polarization states 
for polarization encoding underwater QKD has never 
been analyzed, and the influence of background light 
on the quantum bit error rate (QBER) is not clear. 
In this paper, the QBER and final key rate are 
calculated by analyzing the effect of the background 
light and optical components using a modified QBER 
formula in three propagation modes (upward, 
downward, and horizontal). We first modify the 
formula for calculating the QBER for a QKD system, 
because the previous formula of the QBER ignores the 
influence of detection efficiency and optical element 
transmittance on the background light. Then we 
calculate the background light of the underwater 
channel using Hydrolight [16], a professional software 
that uses Fortran and invariant imbedding, to calculate 
the background light in oceanic optics, and analyze the 
effect of the optical elements in a typical underwater 
BB84 system with polarization coding. We investigate 
the QBER to evaluate the performance of underwater 
QKD and the main factors that affect the QBER of 
underwater QKD according to the modified formula. 
Finally, we calculate the sifted key rate and final key 
rate for underwater QKD in the clearest Jerlov type 
seawater in three propagation modes (upward, 
downward, and horizontal) under full moon condition. 
The results show that the final key rate can reach tens 
of kbits/s for the downward and horizontal modes at a 
distance of 100m, and the maximum secure distance 
can reach hundreds of meters even in the worst 
downward propagation mode. Specifically, by 
optimizing the system parameters, the secure key rate 
for QKD can reach 67kbits/s at a distance of 100 m in 
the seawater channel with an attenuation coefficient 
0.03/m. For practical underwater QKD, the 
performance can also be improved if by using decoy 
states[17, 18]. 
2. QBER OF BB84 PROTOCOL 
According to Ref. [19-21], when Alice transmits the 
weak coherent pulses to Bob, the QBER reads 
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where 
wrongR  is the ratio of wrong bits, including 
the wrong bits induced by the imperfection of optical 
elements (
2
crP e
t
 

), dark counts and background 
light. totalR  is the ratio of total bits detected by Bob, 
including signal 
2
cre
t
 

  dark counts and 
background light. 
dcopt I
Q ,Q and bacQ  are the QBERs 
induced by the imperfection ofoptical elements, the 
dark count of the single-photon detectorsand the 
background light, respectively. P is the polarization 
contrast, which means the ratio of two optical power 
levels with orthogonal polarization.  is the detector 
efficiency for the signal and background light with the 
same wavelength as the signal. As the filter is with a 
narrow bandwidth,    is constant within the 
bandwidth of the filter. t  is the bit period, c

 is 
the attenuation coefficient, r is the transmission 
distance, dc
I
 is the dark counts per second for the 
detector, L is the spectral radiance of environment, A 
is the receiver aperture , t
 is the gate time, h is the 
Journal of the Optical Society of America A  
Planck constant, c is the speed of light in vacuum, ∆λ 
is the filter spectral width, and Ω = 2π (1 − cos (γ/2)), 
which is the solid angle of the field of view(FOV), γ 
is the FOV of the receiver. There are four detectors 
used in a BB84 system and divided into two groups 
(each group consists two detectors). Each signal 
arrives, the data of only one of the four detectors will 
be treated as the signal. So the wrong bits induced by 
dark counts and background light are dcI   and 
4
LA t
hc t
   

, the total bits (the data of one group 
for BB84 protocol) of dark counts and background 
light are 2 dcI  and 
2
LA t
hc t
   

. 
In Eq. 1, 
4
LA t
hc t
   

  is the detected photon 
number of background light for each detector, which 
ignores the effect of the detector efficiency. The 
efficiency include the quantum efficiency η of the 
detector and the transmittance 
opt   of optical 
elements in the receiver. So the detected background 
light will be 
4
optLA t
hc t
    

  Besides, 
scattering in the ocean and its effects on the 
polarization of scattered photons should also be 
considered. Then the sources of wrong bits will 
include: depolarized photons caused by optical 
elements, depolarized photons due to scattering, dark 
counts and detected background light. So, the QBER 
formula (Eq. 1) should be modified to  
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 (2) 
where N is the number of the scattered photons 
received by the detector, sP is the probability of the 
scattered photons that cause errors, and ηopt is the 
transmission of optical elements. The influence of the 
scattered photons has been studied in [14] through 
Monte Carlo method, and the results indicate that the 
majority of the scattered photons could be well filtered 
by small FOV and aperture. So the change in the 
QBER caused by the photon scattering is extremely 
small (about 10-7~10-6), and is negligible compared to 
the following results. In the following sections, we 
will detailed analyze the QBER caused by the 
background light in different types of water, the 
optical elements on polarization, respectively.  
3. ANALYSIS OF BACKGROUND LIGHT  
Underwater background light arises mainly from 
direct incidence and reflection of sunlight, which vary 
with time, location, turbidity of seawater, detection 
direction, etc. The intensity of the background light is 
described by the spectral radiance, which indicates the 
energy emitted from the unit area of a surface radiation 
source in unit solid angle and unit time [16, 22]. 
Previous analyses of the performance of underwater 
QKD generally used the total irradiance (all the 
background light in the visible wavelength) to 
calculate the QBER [12–14]. However, the narrow 
bandpass filter will eliminate most of the background 
light. So, only the light with almost the same 
wavelength as the signal would pass through the filter 
and induce QBER. Thus, we will calculate the spectral 
radiance of the underwater environment. Long 
distance effective key distribution is limited by severe 
attenuation in turbid seawater. However, there is a 
blue-green optical window of seawater [16]. Jerlov 
type seawater is a type of clear open ocean water with 
subtypes I, II, and III to describe its changes with 
turbidity. Jerlov type-I is the clearest ocean water, and 
Jerlov type-II is intermediate [12]. Thus, we calculate 
the spectral radiance at a wavelength of 480nm in 
three different radiation directions (upward, 
downward, and horizontal) at night for several lunar 
phase angles in Jerlov type seawater. In upward mode, 
the propagation direction of the quantum signal is 
upward, the receiver faces downward and is 
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immovable (here, 1 m below the sea surface), and the 
signal transmitter is moved downward to change the 
propagation distance. In downward mode, the signal 
propagates downward. The transmitter remains 
stationary, and the receiver moves downward. In 
horizontal mode, the signal transmitter and receiver 
are located 100 m below the sea surface, and the signal 
is propagated along the horizontal direction. When the 
background light is calculated using Hydrolight, the 
phase function we select is "average particle," and the 
bottom model is "average seagrass." The average 
particle phase function is estimated on the basis of the 
measured data and is adequate for many radiative 
transfer calculations [16]. As examples of Jerlov type-
I and Jerlov type-II water, we calculate the Mid-
Pacific Ocean and Northern Pacific Ocean [12], 
respectively. Thus, the depth of the sea floor is 4000 
m, which is the average depth of the Pacific Ocean 
[23]. The results are illustrated in Fig. 1. Fig. 1(a), (b), 
and (c) show the spectral radiance of the background 
light as a function of depth in Jerlov type-I seawater, 
with an attenuation coefficient of 0.03/m, for different 
lunar phase angles (full moon, gibbous moon, and 
quarter). The results for Jerlov type-II seawater, with 
an attenuation coefficient of 0.18/m, are presented in 
Fig. 1(d), (e), and (f). The spectral radiation clearly 
decreases with increasing depth, and the spectral 
radiance is maximum under full moon conditions.  
Among the threemodes, the downward 
background light has the highest spectral radiance 
magnitude, which is approximate two or three orders 
higher than that of the other two modes. The 
downward light is the downward component of the 
environmental light incident on the water, and the 
horizontal and upward light are generated from 
environmental light by scattering by particulate matter 
in the water and reflection from the sea floor. For clear 
ocean water, the scattered light level is low compared 
to the total light. In general, for the Jerlov type-I 
seawater, the spectral radiance decrease form 
approximate 10-6
2/ ( )W m sr nm    to 10-9
2/ ( )W m sr nm    for downward mode and it 
decreases from approximate 10-9 10-8
2/ ( )W m sr nm  to 10-13~10-11 2/ ( )W m sr nm   
or smaller for the other modes, which will be different 
for different moon phase angle. For the Jerlov type-II 
seawater, which has a attenuation coefficient 0.18/m, 
the spectral radiance will be with a smaller level. 
 
4. EFFECT OF OPTICAL COMPONENTS 
Besides background light, optical elements will 
also induce QBER for underwater QKD. However, 
how a group of optical elements with imperfection 
affect the QBER for a BB84 protocol underwater 
QKD system has never been investigated. In this 
section, as a necessary step to calculate the QBER 
for underwater QKD, we will study how the 
imperfect optical elements affect the polarization. In 
the polarization-encoded BB84 protocol, four 
polarization states will usually be combined by a 
beam splitter (BS) at the transmitter site and split at 
the receiver site. In this paper, the four states we 
consider are Horizontal(H), Vertical(V), 45  (D) 
and 135   (M). Considering the four types of 
polarizations produced by imperfect polarizer and 
wave plate, in this section, we analyze the influence 
of beam splitter, imperfect polarizer and wave plate 
on polarization, and calculate the QBER.  
The relationship between the stokes parameters of 
the incident light beam I0 and the emerging light 
beam I1 after passing through an optical components 
can be described by a 4×4 Mueller matrix [20] .  
For the BB84 protocol shown in Fig. 2, the H and 
V states are transmitted through the BS and the D 
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Fig. 1. (color online) Spectral radiance curve of underwater background radiance in Jerlov type seawater with respect to different lunar 
phase angles. The black down triangle (see the left axis), green up triangle, blue box (see the right axis) stand for downward(D), 
downward(D) and horizontal(H) spectral radiance, respectively. 
and M states are reflected, both at the transmitter and 
receiver. Then the H and V polarized states reaching 
the detector follow 
1 2 1 0p t t pI M M M M I  where 
where 
tM  represents the Mueller matrix of the 
beam splitter for the transmitted light, 
1pM  and 
2pM represent the Mueller matrices of the polarizer 
of the transmitter and receiver with an extinction 
ratio, respectively. The 4 × 4 Mueller matrix of a 
polarizer with a extinction ratio of 
2 is 
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whose other elements are 0. The D, M polarization 
states reaching the detector follows 
2 2 2 1 1 0p hp r r hp pI M M M M M M I ,   where 
1hpM  nd 2hpM represent the Mueller matrices of a 
half wave plate of the transmitter and receiver with a 
retardation accuracy, 
rM  represents the Mueller 
matrix of the beam splitter for the reflected light  
The Mueller matrix of a BS for the transmitted 
light 
tM is 
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and the Mueller matrix of a BS for the reflected light 
rM  is 
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with transmissivity(reflectivity) of where 
( )tp rp  and ( )rp rs   represent the transmissivity 
(reflectivity) for the p and s polarization states, and 
( )t r  represents the phase difference of the p and 
s states for transmitted (reflected) light. The Mueller 
matrix of a wave plate is 
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where δ is the phase difference between the fast and 
slow axis, and θ is the angle of the fast axis, other 
elements are 0. Typically, for a half wave plate, δ = 
π. In practical applications, the extinction ratio of a 
polarizer can reach 1:10000 [21], and the retardation 
accuracy of a wave plate can be limited within λ/300 
[22, 23]. The rotation accuracy of the polarizer and 
the wave plate is 5 arc minutes, which is easy to 
realize for the optical mounts (such as PRM1 of 
Thorlabs).  
Generally, the H, V polarization states are 
minimally influenced by a BS. Because the influence 
of a BS on the polarization states is due to the 
different transmission(reflection) and the phase 
difference of the p and s states. In the ordinary case, 
the 
pr and sr are both 50 ± 5% and the r  s about 
7 9  , then P ≈ 0.017. For the optimized non-
polarizing beam splitters, the 
pr and sr  can reach 
50 ± 0.5%, and (0 0 3)r .
  [24], resulting to P 
≈ 2.3 × 10−4 . Also, we will analyze the QBER and 
key rate under these two situations, an ordinary case 
and an optimal case, in the following section 
 
Fig. 2. . (color online) Sketch of the transmitter and receiver of 
a BB84 protocol, the polarized photons will output from the 
transmitter, propagate through the channel and input into the 
receiver. HWP represents the half wave plate, PBS represents the 
polarization Beam Splitter. 
5. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF 
UNDERWATER QKD SYSTEMS 
The QBER is an important performance 
indicator of QKD. In this section, we first analyze 
the main factors affecting the QBER of underwater 
QKD systems. Then, the QBER for various distances 
is studied for the upward, downward, and horizontal 
transmission modes. Finally, the key rates in the 
three modes are calculated, including the sifted key 
rate and final key rate. 
A. Analysis of the QBER of underwater QKD  
According to Eq. 2, there are three main factors, 
i.e., the dark counts, the background light and the 
misalignment of optical components, contributing to 
the QBER. The dark counts (Idc) and the detection 
efficiency (  ) of single photon detectors directly 
determine the quantum key generation rate and 
distribution distance. Idc,   are 100 counts/s, 20% 
for an ordinary single photon detector and 1 count/s, 
80% for the superconducting nanowire single-
photon detector. The background light is determined 
by the environment, as illustrated in Fig. 1.  
The system parameters used for calculating the 
QBER and key rate of the ordinary and optimal cases 
are listed in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. The same 
parameters are not listed in Table 2. P is calculated  
Journal of the Optical Society of America A  
Table 1. System parameters for the ordinary case 
0.017P   ∆λ=1nm 20  %  
5 t ns  100
dc
I   40f MHZ  
10  mrad  0 1  .  0 03 0 18 c . , . / m  
95 opt %  
230A cm   
in section 4, 
c  is the attenuation coefficient of the 
Jerlov type water, ∆λ in Table 1 is the bandwidth of 
an ordinary filter(such as the filter made in Thorlabs) 
and ∆λ in Table 2 is from Ref. [13], f is the frequency 
of the quantum signal [25], 
opt   is evaluated 
according to the transmissivity of the optical 
elements of the receiver in Fig.6, A is from Ref. [13]. 
Table 2. System parameters for the optimal case 
-4= 2.3 10P  ∆λ=0.12nm 80  %  
200 t ps  1dcI    
  Fig. 
3. (color online) (a). QBER as a function of FOV (with a fixed 
aperture of 30cm2 ). (b). QBER as a function of aperture (with a 
fixed FOV of 10 mrad). The black line (left axis) describes the 
downward mode and the blue and green lines (right axis) describe 
the other two modes. The transmission distance of the signal is 
100 meters. Other system parameters are shown in Table 1. 
We first analyze the QBER caused by the 
background light. For a given condition, the 
background light received by the detector depends 
mainly on the propagation direction, receiver 
aperture and FOV. The effects of the receiver 
aperture and FOV under full moon conditions in 
Jerlov type-I seawater are shown in Fig. 3 (a) and (b), 
respectively. Obviously, the QBER increases as the 
FOV and receiver aperture increase. Fig. 1 (a) shows 
that the intensity of the background light is 
maximum for the downward mode. Secure QKD can 
be achieved when the FOV is less than 11mrad. For 
the upward and horizontal modes, the QBER 
increases slowly when the FOV is in the range of 0 
to more than 10mrad. When the FOV reaches dozens 
of milliradians, the QBER gradually becomes more 
sensitive to the increase in FOV. The background 
light becomes the main factor affecting the QBER. 
As shown in Fig.3 (b), the correlation between the 
QBER and receiver aperture is approximately linear, 
which is especially obvious for the upward and 
horizontal modes. Thus, we can effectively reduce 
the QBER induced by the background noise by 
choosing a smaller FOV, and a small aperture is also 
helpful for reducing the QBER. 
To decrease the influence of the background 
light on underwater QKD, a small FOV (10mrad) 
and aperture (30cm2) in the secure QKD range are 
selected to investigate the relationship between the 
QBER and the propagation distance. Fig 4 shows the 
QBER in Jerlov type-I seawater caused by the 
optical elements optical elements(
optQ  ), the 
background light(
bacQ ) and the dark counts( dcIQ ) 
under full moon condition. moon condition. The  
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Fig. 4. (color online) QBER come from different factors, Qopt, Qbac, QIdc as a function of propagation distance under full moon condition 
with an attenuation coefficient of 0.03/m. (a), (b), (c) are calculated according the parameters shown in Table 1 and (d), (e), (f) are calculated 
according the parameters shown in Table 2 
QBERs in the ordinary case (Table.1) are shown in 
Fig.4 (a), (b), (c). The calculation results show that 
the imperfect optical elements will not have 
significant impact on underwater QKD. For the 
underwater QKD within a distance of 150m for 
upward and horizontal modes, the Qopt, QIdc and 
Qbac are with almost the same level. As the distance 
improves, the dark counts will be the main source for 
the ordinary system according to the results because 
the Idc will keep constant and signal will attenuate 
as increasing distance. Note that Qbac in Fig.4 (a) 
gradually increases and then decreases with 
increasing distance and the effect of the dark counts 
will be more obvious at distances greater than 250 m, 
because attenuation of the background light is 
slightly lower than that of the signal. The QBERs in 
the optimal case (Table.2) are illustrated in Fig.4 (d), 
(e), and (f). When the distance is less than 300 m, 
which is within the maximum estimated distance for 
underwater quantum communication [15, 30], 
optQ
and 
dcI
Q   can almost be ignored in the three 
propagation modes, and the background light will be 
the main factor of the QBER. Generally, the main 
sources of the QBER in long-distance QKD are the 
background light and dark counts. The QBER of the 
optimal system is much smaller than that of the 
ordinary system because both dark counts and 
detected background light are smaller than those of 
the ordinary system. The low dark counts and 
background light make it possible for long distance 
(i.e 300m) QKD in the clearest ocean water for 
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optimal system. For an underwater environment, 
reducing the dark counts and background light can 
reduce the QBER effectively, which is useful for 
remote QKD.To determine the distance of secure 
QKD, we further calculate the total QBER for the 
two types of water with differenttransmission modes 
under full condition. The results are shown in Fig. 5 
and 6. When the attenuation coefficient is 0.03/m, 
the QBER will reach the up boundary of QBER for 
secure QKD (11% [31]) when the distance is 
approximate 130 m for the downward mode and 
approximate 200 m for the other two modes using 
the parameters in Tab. 1. If we use Eq.1 to calculate 
the QBER, the QBER will reach 11% when the 
distance is about 35m for the downward mode and 
about 190m for the other two modes. That’s because 
the background light of the downward mode is the  
 
 
Fig. 5. The total QBER of underwater QKD in Jerlov type 
seawater for the ordinary case with the different attenuation 
coefficient. (a). χc = 0.03/m. (b). χc = 0.18/m. The parameters we 
used to do the calculation are shown in Table 1. 
maximum of the three modes and and Eq.1 will over 
estimate the QBER caused by background light. 
Thus, using the modified formula to calculate the 
QBER is necessary, especially when the background 
light is severe. The distance can exceed 300m if we 
improved the performance of the system (Tab.2). See 
Figs. 5 (a) and 6 (a) for more details. In contrast, for 
the seawater with an attenuation coefficient of 
0.18/m, the secure QKD distance is only a few tens 
of meters in both cases because of severe attenuation. 
The downward mode obviously has the highest 
QBER among the three modes, because the 
background light is strongest when secure 
underwater QKD is performed. 
B. Analysis of the key rate of underwater QKD  
In BB84, through public discussion Alice and 
Bob reject the key bits where they used different 
bases; the remaining key, for which their bases agree, 
is called the “sifted key.” Because the secure final 
key is extracted from the sifted key, which will be 
determined by the parameters of the system, we 
calculated the sifted key for underwater QKD for the 
ordinary system (Tab. 1) and optimal system (Tab. 2) 
as the preceding step towards calculating the secure 
key rate. In BB84 protocol, the sifted key rate is [20]
 
2
link optk f T q ,

        (7) 
where f is the pulse frequency of the laser, linkT  is 
the transmission ratio of seawater channel which 
obeys Beer-Lambert law [25, 32], q  is the sifting 
factor which is usually 1  and typically 1 or 1 2 , 
and k is the rate of sifted key. In this paper, the value 
of q is taken as 1. With the QBER shown in Fig.5 and 
6, we can obtain the sifted key rate of underwater 
QKD , which is illustrated in Fig. 7.  
The sifted key rate for the three modes are the 
same because the parameters in Eq. 7 are 
independent of the direction of transmission. As 
shown in Fig 7, the sifted key rate of underwater 
QKD is approximate 18.9 kbits/s at a distance of 
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100m in the ordinary case and can reach around 76 
kbits/s in the optimal case. 
 
 
Fig. 6. (color online)The total QBER of underwater QKD in 
Jerlov type seawater for the optimal case with the different 
attenuation coefficient. (a). χc = 0.03/m. (b). χc = 0.18/m. The 
parameters we used to do the calculation are shown in Table 2. 
Then, the final key rate for practical QKD with 
decoy state can be estimated according to the GLLP 
formula [29, 30]: 
2 1 2 1[ ( ) ( ) [1 ( )     R q Q f E H E Q H e ,  (8) 
where Q  is the gain of signal states, E  is the 
QBER of singal states, 1Q  is the gain of single- 
photon states, 1e is the error rate of single photons, 
μ )(Ef  is the error correction efficiency and 
μ(E 1)f ， 2 2 2( ) log ( ) (1 ) log (1 ).    H x x x x x  
is the binary Shannon entropy. For the QKD without 
decoy states, the final key will be [29, 30]: 
 
 
Fig. 7. The sifted key rates as a function of propagation distance 
in clear Jerlov type-I seawater, under full moon condition. The 
lines with up triangles, down triangles and squares represent 
upward, downward and horizontal communication modes, 
respectively. (a) is calculated according the parameters shown in 
Table 1 and (b) is calculated according the parameters shown in 
Table 2. 
 
2 2) )[ ( ( (1 ( ))],R Q f E H E H E /         (9) 
where Ω is the fraction of “untagged” photons. Then 
the final key rate in clearest Jerlov type I seawater 
can be calculated, which is shown in Fig. 8.  
For the ordinary system, the security key rate is 
approximate 1.8kbits/s when the propagation 
distance is 100 m for the downward mode and 
approximate 8kbits/s for the other two modes. For 
the optimal optical parameters, the key rate can reach 
57.2kbits/s for downward mode and about 67kbits/s 
for the upward and horizontal modes at a distance of 
100m. The maximum secure distance can reach 
about 310m, 320m and 340m for downward, upward 
and horizontal modes, respectively. For practical 
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QKD with decoy state, the final key rate, which can 
be estimated according to Eq. 8, will be improved. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Final key rate of underwater QKD in the ordinary case (a) 
and in the optimal case (b).(a) is calculated according the 
parameters shown in Table 1 and (b) is calculated according the 
parameters shown in Table 2 
Considering the simple onedecoy protocol [30], 
we have
1 1 1
1
E Q e
Q e Y ,E
Y

  

  ,where 
2
1 2 2
( )  
 
  
 

Y Q e Q e  ,   and ν represent 
the mean photon number per pulse of signal state and 
decoy state, respectively. (a) Full moon, attenuation 
coefficient 0.03/m (b) Full moon, attenuation 
coefficient 0.18/m Fig. 6. (color online)The total 
QBER of underwater QKD in Jerlov type seawater 
for the optimal case with the different attenuation 
coefficient. (a). 
c  = 0.03/m. (b). c  = 0.18/m. 
The parameters we used to do the calculation are 
shown in Table 2. We calculate the final key for the 
ordinary case according to Table.1 under full moon 
condition when   = 0.48 and ν = 0.05. The results 
show that the final key rate can reach 20.3, 32.8 and 
32.7kbits/s at a distance of 100m for the upward, 
downward and horizontal modes, respectively. 
6. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION  
In this paper, we first modified the formula used 
to calculate the QBER. Then we analyzed the 
influence of imperfect optical elements on the 
polarization states and studied the background light 
underwater in detail using Hydrolight. Finally, we 
investigated the performance of underwater QKD. 
Using the modified formula and the background 
light calculated by Hydrolight, we found that the 
sifted bit rate and secure bit rate for QKD in Jerlov 
type-I water are 18.9 and 8kbits/s under full moon 
condition at a distance of 100m, respectively, and the 
maximum distance can reach 200m for the ordinary 
system. For the optimal system, the sifted bit rate and 
secure bit rate for QKD in Jerlov type-I water are 76 
kbits/s and 67kbits/s under full moon condition at a 
distance of 100m, respectively, and the maximum 
distance can exceed 300m. Previous analysis[14] on 
underwater QKD, which used Eq.1 and the total 
irradiance of all visible light to estimate the QBER, 
showed that QKD in Jerlov type-I seawater can be 
performed at a distance of more than 100m under star 
only environment, and QKD cannot be performed 
under full moon condition because the background 
light is so severe that the QBER will exceed 25%. 
However, using Eq.1 and the total irradiance to 
estimate the QBER will overestimate the QBER 
induced by background light. 
Although the final key rate is very low in this 
study, it can be increased by increasing the pulse 
repetition rate f . Typically, for a semiconductor laser 
with a wavelength in the blue-green window, the 
frequency of it can reach 100-200MHZ. The count 
rate of a superconducting nanowire single-photon 
detector can also reach more than 100MHZ. The 
performance of underwater QKD can also be 
improved by applying decoy states, and it is also 
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important to improve the performance of the 
polarization elements and single photon detector. 
With increasing the final key rate and secure 
communication distance, practical application of 
underwater quantum communication will become 
possible in the future. The attenuation coefficient is 
affected by wavelength and the light we analyzed in 
this paper has a wavelength of 480 nm, which is in 
the blue-green optical window of seawater. If 
another wavelength is selected, the results will be 
different and can be calculated accordingly. Further, 
the type of seawater will also affect the attenuation 
coefficient because the main component will differ 
for different types of seawater and the absorption 
peak willvary depending on the component. The 
results show that improving the performance of the 
optical elements, especially the detector, will be 
helpful for implementing underwater QKD. Further, 
the synchronous signal, which is used to control the 
detect to work once the signal is arriving, is also 
necessary for underwater QKD. If photons arriving 
in the same detection window, the data will be 
abandoned or used to check wherther blinding 
attacks exists in the QKD. To avoid the effect of the 
synchronous signal on the QBER, another 
wavelength, also in blue-green range, is necessary 
and the time delay between quantum signal and 
synchronous signal is also essential. In practical 
underwater environments, many other factors will 
affect the propagation of the beam light for 
underwater QKD, such as dot whipping caused by 
turbulence, and wavefront distortion. These factors 
may cause depolarization and extra loss, which will 
effect the QBER and key rat accordingly. However, 
the results here are still available when a stable 
communication link between Alice and Bob is 
established and the reference system between them 
are coincident. To fulfill the requirements, the 
problems affecting the propagation of beam light 
need to be solved by referring to the techniques in 
free space QKD and optical communication, such as 
ATP [10, 11] and adaptive optics system [35]. 
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